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Introduction
The concept of bribery is important to our think-
ing about ethics, especially in professional con-
texts. This is in no small part due to the thought
that, as Seamus Miller has put it, bribery is “a
paradigm of corruption” (Miller 2018, pp. 4–5).
Business persons and corporate entities are often
evaluated by how well they remain free from, root
out, and punish corruption – especially in demo-
cratic societies. It is a common thought, for exam-
ple, that a democratic institution ought to be free
from corruption. Since bribery is often thought a
form – perhaps the paradigmatic form – of cor-
ruption, bribery, too, serves as a central concept in
our evaluations of business persons and corporate
entities.
Although there is no consensus as to what
exactly constitutes bribery, theorists have at least
converged on some common elements of bribery.
This article will lay out three common elements
which together are characteristics of bribery
(payment, intention, and wrongdoing), and then
briefly illustrate how this conjunction of elements
allows for distinguishing between bribery and two
other questionable acts often examined in the
context of business (grease payment and extor-
tion). It is worth clarifying up front that this article
concerns the ethical, rather than legal, notion of
bribery.
Elements of Bribery
Paradigmatic cases of bribery involve, in some
way, payment. As noted by John Douglas Bishop
(2004, p. 3), the “classic case of bribery” involves
giving “money to any person with the intention of
encouraging that person. . . to violate any legiti-
mate moral obligation.” Paradigmatic though
such cases may be, bribery clearly need not
involve money. As John Danley (1983, p. 22)
observes, it is clear upon reflection that more or
less anything of value may serve as a bribe. Sup-
pose a business person offers free and specialized
consulting to a democratically elected politician in
exchange for altered voting behavior. Though
such an arrangement involves no promise or
exchange of money, it is a clear case of bribery.
Although theorists have tended to converge
around an element of payment as crucial to brib-
ery, it is clear that one need not actually make any
payment (or materially transfer anything of value)
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in order to be engaged in an act of bribery. In the
above example, the mere act of offering the con-
sulting services seems sufficient for being
engaged in an act of bribing. This is why many
have, like Danley, provided the disjunctive condi-
tion of bribery, as requiring the giving or offering
of something of value. It is in this more general
sense that bribery is universally thought to include
an element of payment.
In addition to the element of payment, bribery
necessarily involves an element of intentionality.
Of course, not just any payment or offering value
to another person constitutes bribery; instead, a
bribe is a payment with a purpose. While the
specific nature or content of that purpose
(or intention) is the subject of controversy, all
analyses have in common some connection to
wrongdoing (the third basic element of bribery).
Some, like Bishop (2004), D’Andrade (1985,
p. 329), and Turow (1985), hold that bribing
someone is intended to “induce that person to
commit an improper act.” On this view, the
wrongdoing which the act of bribing is intended
to produce need not have any particular nature; so
long as someone is by prospect of value intention-
ally induced to do something wrong, bribery is
afoot.
Others, like James, Jr. (2002, p. 71), hold that
bribery is intended to induce an agent of a princi-
pal to do something contrary to their duty qua
agent of principal, and therefore also to do some-
thing which is not in the interest of the principal.
On this view, bribery is only possible within the
context of an agent-principal relationship.
Others still, like Danley (1983), Carson (1985,
p. 71), Noonan (1984), Philips (1984), and
Pritchard (1998), hold that a bribe must be
exchanged for something which would be
“incompatible with the duties of the office, posi-
tion, or role” of the bribee. On this view, the
wrongdoing elicited by an act of bribing is neither
completely general nor limited to agent-principal
relationships. Instead, the wrongdoing takes the
form of abandoning the duties of one’s station, as
it were – violating duties specific to a role occu-
pied by the bribee.
Unsettled controversy aside, notice that, on
any of these three characterizations, an act does
not count as an act of bribing if the incentivized
action merely happens to be wrong. Rather, the
bribe must be intended to produce the wrongdo-
ing, and so the briber in some sense must be aware
that the act they hope to induce would be wrong.
Putting these three elements together, bribery
may be specially, even if generally and not finally,
characterized as an exchange involving a briber,
who gives or offers something of value to some
other person (the bribee) with the intent that the
bribee does some act which would be wrong –
either by its general nature, or due to the specific
role that the bribee occupies.
This provides some hint as to why it is that
bribery is (usually) wrong. One who offers a
bribe performs an action intending that that action
will result in wrongdoing. Plausibly, it is generally
wrong to intend to induce others to do wrong. One
who accepts a bribe either (i) does indeed perform
the wrong act which the bribe is intended to
induce or (ii) at least implicitly agrees to perform
that wrong act. It is self-evident that cases of the
first type involve wrongdoing. With respect to
cases of the second type, we may observe the
plausibility of the thought that it is generally
wrong to (genuinely) agree to do wrong.
Bribery and Other Business
Any satisfactory account of bribery must be able
to answer the question as to what distinguishes
bribery from two other phenomena related to and
sometimes confused with bribery: grease payment
and extortion. The above analysis of bribery
allows for just that.
As Carson (1985, pp. 68, 79–80) notes, grease
payments are payments made in order to facilitate
or expedite routine or normal processes, events, or
services. For example, a payment may be made in
order to hasten the passage of goods through
customs. Note that such a payment is not made
in order to obtain passage of goods through cus-
toms – goods which would otherwise not be
passed through. Assuming that the goods should
be passed through customs, the grease payment is
made to facilitate or expedite that permissible
process. In other words, the grease payment
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provides incentive for the customs officials to
perform their professional duties. This is exactly
the opposite of the intended effect of a bribe,
which is to incentivize nonperformance of duties.
The fundamental distinction between bribery and
grease payment, then, is made in the element of
intentionality: whereas bribes are intended to pro-
duce wrongdoing, grease payments are not.
Extortion differs from bribery in at least two
important aspects. Consider a paradigmatic exam-
ple of extortion: a local mafioso enters your corner
store and threatens to destroy the place unless you
pay him for “protection.” Clearly, the mafioso
extorts you; but his action lacks the crucial ele-
ments of bribery discussed above. First, the mafi-
oso does not necessarily offer you something of
value; instead, he threatens you. Second, the mafi-
oso need not intend to induce wrongdoing on your
part; instead, he intends merely to extract from
you something of value (money). If we can
roughly (even if not definitively) characterize
extorting as using threat to improperly extract
something of value, it clearly diverges from brib-
ery in the elements of payment and intent: while
the briber offers something of value in exchange
for some perceived wrongdoing, the extortionist
threatens disvalue unless something of value is
given.
There are of course other significant metaphys-
ical, ethical, and legal questions related to bribery,
which this article has not touched on or settled; for
example, what is the precise nature of the wrong-
doing involved in bribery, the moral status of
making grease payments or extortion payments,
and what corporate or public policies should be
enacted to manage such things.
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